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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appe l lant was charged with d r i v i n g under the i n f l u e n c e 
of a l c o h o l in v i o l a t i o n of Bount i fu l Ci ty Code No. 8 - 4 * 5 0 1 . At 
t h e time of a p p e l l a n t ' s a r r e s t the a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r gave 
a p p e l l a n t n o t i c e of i n t e n t t o suspend h i s d r i v e r 1 s l i c e n s e 
pursuant t o Utah Code Ann. § 4 1 - 2 - 1 9 . 6 (Supp. 1 9 8 6 ) . 
At a hear ing b e f o r e t h e Off ice of Driver L icense 
S e r v i c e s on May 3 0 , 1985 , the a p p e l l a n t ' s l i c e n s e was suspended 
for 120 days pursuant t o Utah Code Ann. § 4 1 - 2 - 1 9 . 6 (Supp. 1 9 8 6 ) . 
The s u s p e n s i o n was aff irmed on appeal on November 7 , 1985 i n the 
Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court, in and for Davis County, S t a t e of 
Utah, the Honorable Douglas Cornaby, Judge, p r e s i d i n g . A p p e l l a n t 
now a p p e a l s from t h a t o r d e r . 
STATEMENT OF FACT? 
On May 2 , 1985 a t 5:35 p . m . , O f f i c e r Clay Kone r e c e i v e d 
a c a l l from h i s d i s p a t c h e r regarding a c i t i z e n ' s repor t of a 
p o s s i b l e drunk d r i v e r (R. 2 4 ) . The d i s p a t c h e r i n d i c a t e d the 
v e h i c l e f s make, color and probable d irect ion of travel (R. 30)* 
Officer Kone f i r s t observed appel lant in the same make and color 
of car described by the dispatcher t r a v e l l i n g westbound on 1800 
South at approximately 350 East (R. 24 ) . The appel lant made a 
wide curve and nearly crossed over the double yellow l i n e (R. 
24)* The o f f i c e r followed appellant when he turned into S t . 
Olaf ' s l o t (R. 2 5 ) . When the o f f i cer approached appellant he 
smelled alcohol on appel lant 1 s breath and observed appe l lant ' s 
eyes to be bloodshot (R. 2 6 ) . Appellant agreed to perform f i e l d 
sobriety t e s t s (R. 26) . He performed poorly on the nystagmus 
t e s t and alphabet count t e s t (R. 26, 4 6 ) . The o f f i cer bel ieved 
that appel lant had been operating a motor v e h i c l e while under the 
inf luence of alcohol and he placed appellant under arres t . He 
asked appel lant to take a breathalyzer t e s t (R. 46) and appellant 
consented (R. 4 6 ) . The breath t e s t r e s u l t s showed a blood 
alcohol content of .28% (R. 27, 46) . Appel lant 1 s l i c e n s e was 
suspended after a hearing before a hearing o f f i c e r and t h i s order 
was affirmed on appeal in the D i s t r i c t Court. Appellant now 
appeals the suspension. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 4 1 - 6 - 1 6 (1981) g r a n t s l o c a l 
a u t h o r i t i e s the power to adopt addit ional t r a f f i c regulat ions 
cons i s t en t with T i t l e 41 of the Utah Code. Accordingly the 
arres t ing o f f i c e r properly arrested appellant for v i o l a t i o n of 
Bountiful City Code No. 8 -4-501 . Once appel lant was arrested for 
driving while under the influence of a lcohol , the o f f i cer 
appropriately gave appellant not ice of intent to suspend h i s 
l i c e n s e under Utah Code Ann. S 41-2-19.6 (Supp. 1986) . 
- 2 -
The r ight to drive i s a pr iv i lege subject to cer ta in 
condi t ions . Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-19.6 (Supp. 1986) authorizes 
the suspension of a l icense if the driver has a blood alcohol 
level of .08% or more. The suspension of appel lan t 1 s l icense 
pursuant to § 41-2-19.6 is not a criminal sanction and thus § 41-
2-19.6 i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . 
Based upon the ca l l from the dispatcher , the a r res t ing 
officer had a reasonable suspicion that appellant was driving 
while intoxicated and thus the stop of appellant was j u s t i f i e d . 
Appellant 's consent to perform the f i e ld sobriety t e s t s 
did not v io l a t e his pr iv i lege against se l f - incr iminat ion, since 
the appellant was not under a r r e s t and the officer was s t i l l in 
the invest igatory s tage. Appellant 's performance on the 
breathalyzer was also admissible since th i s case i s a c i v i l case, 
not cr iminal , and since Hansen v. Owensf 619 P.2d 315 (Utah 1980) 
has been overruled. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ARRESTING OFFICER HAD AUTHORITY TO ACT 
PURSUANT TO THE BOUNTIFUL CITY ORDINANCE 
AND UTAH STATE CODE. 
Appellant argues tha t a l icense can only be suspended 
under Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-19.6 (Supp. 1986) when an officer has 
reasonable grounds to believe that a person may be v io la t ing Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 1986). Spec i f ica l ly , appellant argues 
that because the officer ar res ted appellant for v io la t ion of 
Bountiful City Code No. 8-4-501 not Utah Code Ann. S 41-6-44 tha t 
the officer did not have authori ty to suspend appe l l an t ' s 
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license. Appellant does not challenge the constitutionality of 
the Bountiful City Ordinance. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-16 (1981) expressly grants local 
authorities the power to adopt additional traffic regulations 
consistent with Title 41 of the Utah Code. See also Utah Code 
Ann. S 41-6-43 (Supp. 1986). Bountiful City, in accordance with 
this authority, has passed a municipal law prohibiting persons 
from driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated. A copy of 
Bountiful City Code No. 8-4-501 is contained in Addendum A. 
Both the Utah statute and the Bountiful ordinance 
require the police officer to have reasonable cause to believe a 
violation has been committed. Accordingly, since Officer Kone 
had reasonable cause to believe that appellant was driving while 
under the influence of alcohol, the appellant was properly 
arrested for driving while the the influence of alcohol and cited 
for violating the Bountiful City Ordinance. Once appellant was 
arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol, the 
officer appropriately gave appellant notice of intent to suspend 
his license under Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-19.6 (Supp. 1986). 
The citation issued by the officer stated not only that 
appellant had violated Bountiful City Ordinance No. 8-4-501, but 
also gave appellant specific notice of intent to suspend his 
license pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-19.6 (Supp. 1986) (R. 
45). 
Finally, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-16 (1981) states that 
•the provisions of this act shall be applicable and uniform 
throughout this state and in all political subdivisions and 
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munic ipa l i t i e s there in ." Thus § 41-6-44 was c l ear ly appl icable 
when appellant was arrested for driving while in tox ica ted . In 
t h i s case a p p e l l a n t s l i c e n s e was suspended based upon v i o l a t i o n 
of a Bountiful City Ordinance lawfully enacted pursuant to § 41-
6-16. Such suspension was according to Utah law and was neither 
arbitrary nor capric ious . 
POINT II 
UTAH CODE ANN. S 41-2-19.6 (SUPP. 1986) 
DOES NOT IMPOSE A CRIMINAL PENALTY PRIOR 
TO A CRIMINAL CONVICTION. 
Appellant claims that Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-19.6 (Supp. 
1986) is unconstitutional since a driver may lose his driving 
privilege before he is criminally convicted of driving while 
intoxicated. Specifically, appellant argues that § 41-2-19.6 
imposes the same penalty as if appellant were convicted of the 
crime of drunk driving (App. Br. at 5). 
Section 41-2-19.6 provides that if a driver has a blood 
alcohol content of .08% or more, the officer shall serve 
immediate notice of intent to suspend the person's license. The 
officer shall then take the license and issue a temporary license 
effective for 30 days and supply the driver with a form on how to 
obtain a prompt hearing. Upon written request of a driver, the 
department shall hold a hearing. After the hearing, the 
department shall order either that the person1s license be 
suspended or that it not be suspended. A copy of S 41-2-19.6 is 
contained in addendum A. Section 41-2-19.6 clearly does not 
provide criminal punishment for the crime of driving under the 
influence of alcohol. Utah Code Ann. S 41-6-44 (Supp. 1986) 
provides the appropriate criminal punishment. 
Appellant appears to argue that an order of suspension 
i s punishment for conviction of a crime. This argument i s 
untenable in l i g h t of t h i s Cour t ' s ruling tha t " [ t lhe r ight to 
drive i s a pr iv i lege conferred subject to condi t ions; and i t may 
be revoked if those conditions are v io l a t ed . " Wisden v. City of 
Sa l ina , 709 P.2d 371 (Utah 1985), c i t i ng Smith v. Cox, 609 P.2d 
1332 (Utah 1980) . 
Further, t h i s Court has repeatedly ruled tha t an action 
in defense of appe l l an t ' s driving pr iv i leges i s a c i v i l , not 
cr iminal , matter . Larson v. Schwendiman, 712 P.2d 244 (Utah 
1985); Smith v. Cox, 609 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1980); Cavaness v. Cox, 
598 P.2d 349 (Utah 1979); Ballard v. S ta te , Motor Vehicle 
Division, 595 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1979). This Court s ta ted in 
Bal lard , 595 P.2d a t 1305: 
The revocation proceeding i s separate and 
d i s t i n c t from a criminal action on a charge 
of driving under the influence, and a 
different burden of proof app l i e s . 
The purpose of t h i s adminis t ra t ive procedure 
i s not to punish the inebr ia ted d r ive r s ; 
such persons are subject to separate criminal 
prosecution for the purpose of punishment. 
The adminis trat ive revocation proceedings are 
to protect the publ ic , not to punish individual 
dr ivers . . . 
In fac t , acqui t ta l of the defendant under the 
criminal proceedings i s not a bar to revocation 
of the opera to r ' s l i c ense . ( c i t a t ions omitted) 
Final ly , Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-19.6 provides procedural 
safeguards before a l icense revocation or suspension becomes 
f i n a l . F i r s t , a peace officer i ssues a temporary l icense to the 
driver ef fec t ive for 30 days, and supplies the driver with 
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information on how to obtain a prompt hearing before the 
department* Second, the driver is entitled to a hearing within 
30 days after the date of arrest, if such hearing is properly 
requested. The hearing shall address whether the peace officer 
had reasonable grounds to believe the person was operating a 
motor vehicle in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 
1986). Third, a person whose license has been suspended may file 
a petition within 30 days for a hearing in a court of record in 
the county where such person resides. Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-20 
(Supp. 1986). Finally, the driver can appeal to the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
Because this Court has ruled that an action in defense 
of driving privileges is civil not criminal and § 41-2-19.6 
provides appropriate procedural safeguards, § 41-2-19.6 is 
constitutional. 
POINT III 
THE ARRESTING OFFICER HAD A REASONABLE SUSPI-
CION THAT THE APPELLANT WAS DRIVING WHILE 
INTOXICATED, AND THUS THE STOP OF APPELLANT 
WAS JUSTIFIED. 
Appellant argues tha t the ar res t ing officer stopped him 
based upon mere suspicion not probable cause and thus, the a r r e s t 
was unlawful. Specif ica l ly , appellant claims the only reason the 
a r res t ing officer stopped appellant was because of a cal l from 
a p p e l l a n t ' s wife to the dispatcher that appellant may be driving 
while in toxica ted . 
When determining whether an invest igatory stop of an 
automobile, l ike tha t at issue here, i s lawful, the court must 
ask whether the police off icers acted upon "reasonable 
- 7 -
susp ic ion ," not "probable cause." United S ta te s v . Cortez, 4949 
U.S. 411 (1981); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); State v . Swanigan, 
699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985); State v. Gibson, 665 P.2d 1302 (Utah 
1983) . 
The appropriate standard for investigate detentions was 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1 (1968); and Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979); 
and is codified in Utah as follows: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has reasonable sus-
picion to believe he has committed or is 
in the act of committing or is attempting 
to commit a public offense and may demand 
his name, address and an explanation of 
his actions. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1982). £>ee also. United States v. 
Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. 
Merritt, 736 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1984); State v. Swanigan, 699 
P.2d 718 (Utah 1985). The reasonable suspicion standard also 
applies to investigative stops involving vehicles. United States 
v. Sharpe, U.S. , 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1573 (1985). The 
reasonable suspicion test for investigatory stops reflects a 
reasonable and workable approach to the question of whether a 
particular stop is constitutional. It strikes an appropriate 
balance between the promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests and the individual's interest in being free from 
intrusions on fundamental constitutional rights. Illinois v. 
LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640, 644 (1983); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648, 655 (1979). 
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This Court considered the "informal arrest" or stop and 
detention situation in State v. Torres, 29 Utah 2d 269, 508 P.2d 
534 (1973). In that case, this Court said that the test to be 
applied on the question as to whether appellant's constitutional 
rights have been abridged: 
[ils one of reasonableness: that is, 
whether fair-minded persons, knowing the 
facts, and taking into consideration not 
only the rights of the individuals in-
volved in the inquiry or search, but also 
the broader interests of the public to be 
protected from crime and criminals, would 
regard the conduct of the officers as be-
ing unreasonable [footnote omitted]. 
29 Utah 2d at 271, 508 P.2d at 536. Sge. also, Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968). Furthermore, 
The determination should be made on an ob-
jective standard: whether from the facts 
known to the officer, and the inferences 
which fairly might be drawn therefrom, a 
reasonable and prudent person in his posi-
tion would be justified in believing that 
the suspect had committed the offense. 
State v. Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318, 495 P.2d 
1295 (1972). 
State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980). 
To justify the stop of appellant the officer must have 
had "a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts," that 
appellant was committing a public offense. State v. Swanigan, 
699 P.2d 718, 719 (Utah 1985) quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 
47, 51 (1979); Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1982). The 
reasonableness of the detention must be judged by an objective 
standard, i.e., "would the facts available to the officer at the 
moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant of a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was 
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appropriate?" Terry v, Ohio, 392 U.S. l r 21-22 (1968); see a l so . 
State v. Car ter , 19 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Sept. 27, 1985). 
Appellant claims tha t the only reason the officer 
stopped appellant was because of the d i spa tcher ' s c a l l , "which 
was based on double hearsay evidence from a th i rd person." (App. 
Br. 6 ) . 
In S ta te v. E l l i o t t , 626 P.2d 423 (Utah 1981) , t h i s 
Court upheld an invest igatory stop based on a c i t i z e n ' s report 
t ha t the defendant was t ry ing to s e l l t i r e s and auto pa r t s at a 
reduced pr ice in order to buy gas. This Court s t a t ed : 
The Fourth Amendment does not require a 
policeman who lacks the precise level 
of information necessary for probable 
cause to a r r e s t to simply shrug h is 
shoulders and allow a crime to occur 
or a criminal to escape. On the con-
t r a r y , Terry recognizes tha t i t may be 
the essence of good police work to 
adopt an intermediate response. . . . 
A brief stop of a suspicious indiv idual , 
in or to determine his iden t i ty or to 
maintain the s t a tu s quo momentarily 
while obtaining more information, may 
be most reasonable in l i gh t of the 
fac t s known to the officer a t the t ime. 
[Citat ions omitted.] 
E l l i o t t , 626 P.2d a t 425, c i t ing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 
145 (1972) . 
This case i s also s imilar to Sta te v. Sharp, 702 P.2d 
959 (Mont. 1985). There, a c i t i zen cal led the police to report a 
poss ible drunk driving offense and gave the dispatcher the c a r ' s 
l icense p la te number, descr ip t ion and the d i rec t ion of t r a v e l . 
These fac t s were corroborated when the officer found the 
described vehicle stopped halfway off the road in the d i rec t ion 
and on the highway reported by the c a l l e r . The driver began to 
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pul l away when the of f icer approached the car. The Court found 
that the o f f i cer had a right based on reasonable suspic ion and 
l o g i c a l inference, to stop the defendant's v e h i c l e , gharp, 702 
P.2d at 962. 
The informer in the instant case was a c i t i z e n f the 
a p p e l l a n t ' s wi fe , not a profess ional informer. Because the 
c i t i z e n informer witnessed the a c t i v i t y , described the make and 
and color of the veh ic l e and i t s d irect ion of t r a v e l , and 
i d e n t i f i e d herse l f to the dispatcher, the information i s 
s u f f i c i e n t l y r e l i a b l e . People v. Donnelly . 691 P.2d 747, 749 
(Colo. 1984) . See a l s o . State v . Sharp, 702 P.2d 959 (Mont. 
1985) (information provided by a c i t i z e n informant i s 
presumptively r e l i a b l e ) ; City of Nome v. Ailak, 570 P.2d 162 
(Ala. 1977) ( i f informant i s a cooperative c i t i z e n , h i s 
r e l i a b i l i t y need not be es tabl i shed before arrest on bas is of 
information supplied by him). 
The circumstances present in the instant case were 
s u f f i c i e n t to give r i s e to the reasonable suspic ion required for 
the stop of appel lant . The o f f i cer received a c a l l from his 
dispatcher regarding Mr. Kirsl ing (R. 29 , 34 ) . A c i t i z e n ca l l ed 
the po l ice department and reported that Mr. Kirsl ing was driving 
a s i l v e r Lincoln and may be intoxicated (R. 29-30) . Although the 
o f f i cer i n i t i a l l y t e s t i f i e d that the only reason he stopped 
appel lant was because of the c a l l from the dispatcher (R. 30 ) , 
the o f f i cer a l so t e s t i f i e d that when the appellant drove past the 
o f f i c e r , the appellant was hunched over s tar ing s tra ight ahead 
and had the manner of an intox icated person (R. 25, 2 9 ) , and 
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based upon these observations the officer would have stopped 
Kirsl ing without the ca l l from the dispatcher (R. 34). The 
officer also observed appellant approach the center l ine of the 
road and jerk away from the center l i n e when he went in to a turn 
(R. 24, 25) . As such, the officer not only had the r i g h t , but 
the duty to make observations and inves t iga t ions to determine 
whether the law was being v io la ted . State v. Folkes, 565 P.2d 
1125, 1127 (Utah 1977); Sta te v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 105 
(Utah 1980) . 
Once the officer stopped appel lant , the officer 
detected the odor of alcohol and observed appe l l an t ' s eyes to be 
bloodshot (R. 26) . Appellant consented to perform f ie ld sobriety 
t e s t s and performed poorly on two of the t e s t s (R. 26, 46). 
Based upon h is observat ions, the officer obtained a reasonable 
belief tha t appel lant was in toxicated and placed him under 
a r r e s t . The officer then requested tha t appellant submit to a 
breath t e s t pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-19.6(1) (Supp. 
1986) . Appellant then agreed to a breath t e s t and had a blood 
alcohol level of .28% (R. 46). 
Appellant c i t e s Worthington v. United S t a t e s , 166 F.2d 
557 (6th Ci r . 1968)1 as author i ty tha t mere suspicion i s not 
enough to cons t i tu t e probable cause for a r r e s t without a warrant. 
Worthington i s c lear ly inappl icable to the fac t s of the case a t 
bar. The issue in Worthington was whether the off icers had 
probable cause to believe defendant was committing a felony and 
* Appellant c i t e s t h i s case as Mai lory v» United S t a t e s , however 
the correct case name i s Worthington v. United S t a t e s . 
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whethe r t h e w a r r a n t l e s s a r r e s t and s u b s e q u e n t w a r r a n t l e s s s e a r c h 
of d e f e n d a n t ' s r e s i d e n c e was l a w f u l . The p r e s e n t c a se p e r t a i n s 
t o a t empora ry s t o p and an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s u s p e n s i o n of a 
d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e fo r d r i v i n g w h i l e i n t o x i c a t e d , n o t a w a r r a n t l e s s 
a r r e s t and s e a r c h for a c r i m i n a l o f f e n s e . 
A p p e l l a n t ' s r e l i a n c e on P e o p l e v . McGaughran, 25 C a l . 
3d 5 7 7 , 601 P .2d 2 0 7 , 159 C a l . R p t r . 191 (1979) i s a l s o 
m i s p l a c e d . In McGaughran, t h e i s s u e was whe the r an o f f i c e r who 
has s t o p p e d a m o t o r i s t fo r a t r a f f i c v i o l a t i o n fo r which t h e 
m o t o r i s t can no t be t a k e n i n t o c u s t o d y , and ha s d e t a i n e d t h e 
m o t o r i s t fo r t h e p e r i o d n e c e s s a r y t o pe r fo rm h i s f u n c t i o n s 
a r i s i n g from t h e v i o l a t i o n , can t h e r e a f t e r l a w f u l l y d e t a i n him 
fo r an a d d i t i o n a l p e r i o d of t i m e s o l e l y for t h e p u r p o s e of 
c o n d u c t i n g a w a r r a n t c h e c k . 
Because an o f f i c e r may s t o p a d r i v e r when t h e o f f i c e r 
h a s a r e a s o n a b l e s u s p i c i o n based on o b j e c t i v e f a c t s t h a t an 
o f f e n s e h a s been commit ted and h e r e t h e o f f i c e r had r e a s o n a b l e 
s u s p i c i o n based on t h e c a l l from d i s p a t c h and h i s p e r s o n a l 
o b s e r v a t i o n s , t h e s t o p was l a w f u l . 
POINT IV 
THE FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS AND BREATHALYZER 
TEST DID NOT VIOLATE APPELLANT'S PRIVILEGE 
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. 
A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r i n t h e i n s t a n t 
c a s e i l l e g a l l y o b t a i n e d e v i d e n c e when he r e q u e s t e d a p p e l l a n t t o 
perform f i e l d s o b r i e t y t e s t s and t h e b r e a t h a l y z e r t e s t . 
S p e c i f i c a l l y , a p p e l l a n t r e l i e s upon Hansen v . Owens , 619 P.2d 315 
(Utah 1980) and c l a i m s t h a t an a c c u s e d c a n n o t be compe l l ed t o 
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perform any affirmative acts which could be used as "evidence" 
against him. Appellant argues that because his driver's license 
was suspended based on probable cause, that the suspension is 
really a criminal, not a civil sanction. 
The State acknowledges that the appellant has a 
constitutional right not to give evidence against himself if it 
is to be used against him in a criminal proceeding. Smith v. 
Cox, 609 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1980). However, the State contends 
that: (1) the appellant was not compelled to perform field 
sobriety tests, and (2) the present case is civil, not criminal, 
in nature and thus Hansen is inapplicable. 
In Salt Lake City v. earner, 664 P. 2d 1168 (Utah 1983) 
this Court addressed the issue of whether performance of field 
sobriety tests constituted giving evidence against oneself under 
Hansen v. Owens, 619 P.2d 315 (Utah 1980). There, the defendant 
argued that at the time he was asked to perform the tests he was 
in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom and thereby 
"compelled" to give evidence against himself. This Court found 
that temporary detention for the purpose of investigating alleged 
traffic violations is not synonymous with in custody 
interrogation. 
The officer was still in the investigatory 
stage when he asked the defendant to per-
form field sobriety tests. If the defen-
dants ability to drive a vehicle had not 
been impaired or was impaired for a reason 
other than being under the influence, 
there may have been no crime committed. 
Therefore, the officer in requesting field 
sobriety tests, was continuing to ascertain 
whether a crime had been committed at all. 
As soon as the officer determined that the 
defendant's driving appeared to be impaired 
due to alcohol, he did a r res t him. Until 
that time the officer was e n t i t l e d to in-
ves t iga te circumstances at the scene with-
out giving the defendant a Miranda warning. 
Since the defendant was not in custody, or 
otherwise s ign i f ican t ly deprived of h i s 
freedom, custody did not compel him to 
take f i e ld sobriety t e s t s . And, nothing 
suggests tha t he was compelled in any other 
way. Defendant was requested and he agreed, 
both verbally and by attempts at compliance, 
to perform the f ie ld sobriety t e s t s . No 
facts indicate tha t he was forced, coerced 
or intimidated into performing them. 
Rather, i t appears tha t he performed them 
vo lun ta r i ly . We therefore , hold tha t the 
defendant was not "compelled to give evi-
dence against himself" in v io la t ion of our 
s t a t e cons t i tu t ion . 
Carner, 664 P.2d a t 1172. 
In the ins tant case the officer was c lear ly 
inves t iga t ing possible criminal a c t i v i t y based upon a ca l l 
received through dispatch (R. 30) . Once the officer stopped 
appellant the officer detected an odor of alcohol and observed 
appe l lan t 1 s eyes to be bloodshot (R. 26) . S t i l l invest igat ing a 
possible crime, the officer requested appellant to submit to 
f i e ld sobriety t e s t s (R. 26) . Based on appe l l an t ' s performance 
on the blood t e s t , the officer determined tha t appellant was 
under the influence of alcohol and placed appellant under a r res t 
(R. 26). Jus t as in Carnerf the officer in the ins tant case was 
s t i l l in the invest igatory stage when he asked appellant to 
perform f ie ld sobriety t e s t s . Until the officer ar res ted 
appellcint there was no deprivation of appe l l an t ' s freedom and as 
this Court found in Carner appellant was not compelled to take 
the f i e ld sobriety t e s t s . 
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Appellant strongly r e l i e s upon flansen v. Owensy 619 
P.2d 315 (Utah 1980) as author i ty that the appel lant was 
compelled to perform an affirmative ac t . In Hansen t h i s Court 
held that an accused could not be compelled to furnish examples 
of his handwriting for use in connection with a charge of forgery 
against him. This Court found that an order d i rec t ing the 
accused to perform the affirmative act of wri t ing v io la ted his 
cons t i tu t iona l r igh ts since Ar t i c le I § 12 provides that "The 
accused shal l not be compelled to give evidence against himself." 
The Hansen court further s ta ted tha t i t s holding would be l imited 
to the pa r t i cu la r fac ts of tha t case. Hansen, 619 P.2d a t 317. 
This Court overruled Hansen in American Fork v. 
Cosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1985). In Cosgrove, t h i s court 
s ta ted that the affirmative act standard suggested in Hansen has 
l i t t l e to recommend i t s e l f . This Court then ruled tha t Ar t i c l e I 
S 12 i s l imited to s i tua t ions where the Sta te seeks evidence of a 
testimonial or communicative nature . Therefore, "the defendant 's 
r ights under the Utah Cons t i tu t ion ' s se l f - incr iminat ion provision 
were not v io la ted when, af ter his a r r e s t , he was required to 
submit to a breathalyzer t e s t under the th rea t of losing his 
d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e . " Cosgrovey 701 P.2d a t 1075. 
Appel lant ' s re l iance on Hansen i s c lear ly misplaced for 
several reasons. F i r s t , t h i s Court has repeatedly held tha t a 
l i cense revocation procedure i s c i v i l , not cr iminal , in nature . 
Smith v. Cox, 609 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1980); Cavaness v. Cox, 598 
P.2d 349 (Utah 1979); Ballard v. S t a t e , 595 P.2d 1302 (Utah 
1979). As t h i s Court s ta ted in Bal lard; 
[T]he revocation proceeding i s separate 
and d i s t i n c t from a criminal act ion on a 
charge of driving under the influence, 
and a different burden of proof appl ies , 
A person refusing a chemical t e s t i s not 
required to post bond for his appearance, 
nor i s he under any legal duty to appear 
a t the adminis t ra t ive hearing in which 
the determination may be made to revoke 
the ope ra to r ' s l i cense . He cannot be 
fined or imprisoned e i ther for his r e -
fusal to submit to a t e s t or for his 
f a i lu re to appear at the hearing. If 
he f a i l s to appear or if the Division 
of Motor Vehicles determines the person 
was granted the r ight to submit to a 
chemical t e s t and refused, the Divis ion 's 
authori ty i s l imited to revocation of the 
l icense for one year. 
Ballard, 595 P.2d at 1305.^ Because the issue in the Hansen case 
pertained to an accused's r ight not to give incriminating 
evidence against himself in a criminal proceeding, and the 
present case i s a c iv i l proceeding Hansen i s inappl icable . 
Further, t h i s Court spec i f ica l ly s ta ted in Hansen, 
•[w]e do not mean th i s decision to be understood as going beyond 
i t s pa r t i cu la r f a c t s . " Hanseny 619 P.2d a t 317. Since the 
appellant in the ins tan t case was not ordered to give a 
handwriting sample in a criminal proceeding, again Hansen i s 
inappl icable . 
Final ly , t h i s Court addressed an issue similar to the 
present one in parson v. Schwendiman, 712 P.2d 244 (Utah 1985). 
There, the appellant claimed the officer had a duty to advise 
appellant as to the d i s t inc t ion between the se l f - incr iminat ion 
1
 Although appe l l an t ' s l icense was suspended not revoked t h i s 
Court ' s reasoning in pa l la rd i s s t i l l applicable since the 
suspension of a l icense i s a lso an adminis t ra t ive act ion. Utah 
Code Ann. S 41-2-19.6 (Supp. 1986). 
provision of the Utah Constitution Article I § 12 and the United 
States Constitution, Amendment V, This Court stated, Mw]e need 
only observe that Hansen is not applicable to this civil 
proceeding and was overruled by our recent decision in American 
Fork City v. Cosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1985). In Larson, 712 
P.2d at 246 the same analysis applies in the case at bar. 
Because the present case is a civil proceeding and Hansen was 
overruled, Hansen is inapplicable and this Court should find tha 
the appellant was not compelled to perform any affirmative acts. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to affirm the trial court and to find that appellant's license 
was properly suspended. 
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ADDENDUM A 
41-2-19.6. Chemical test — Grounds and procedure for 
officer's request — Taking license — Report to 
department — Procedure by department — 
Suspension. 
(1) When a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person 
may be violating or has violated section 41-6-44 the peace officer may, in 
connection with his arrest of the person, request the person to submit to a 
chemical test to be administered in compliance with the standards set forth 
in section 41-6-44.10. 
(2) The peace officer shall advise a person prior to the person's submis-
sion to a chemical test that results indicating .08*2 or more by weight of 
alcohol in the blood shall, and the existence of a blood alcohol content 
sufficient to render the person incapable of safely driving a vehicle can, 
result in suspension or revocation of the person's license or privilege to 
operate a motor vehicle. 
(3) If the person submits to that chemical test and the results indicate a 
blood alcohol content of .08^ or more, or if the officer makes a determina-
tion, based on reasonable grounds to believe that the determination is 
correct, that the person is otherwise in violation of section 41-6-44, the 
officer directing administration of the test or making the determination 
shall serve on the person, on behalf of the department, immediate notice of 
the department's intention to suspend the person's privilege or license to 
drive. If the officer serves that immediate notice on behalf of the depart-
ment he shall take the Utah driver license or certificate or permit, if any, of 
the driver, issue a temporary license effective for only 30 days, and supply 
to the driver, on a form to be approved by the department, basic informa-
tion regarding how to obtain a prompt hearing before the department. A 
citation issued by the officer may, if approved as to form by the department, 
serve also as the temporary license. 
(4) The peace officer serving the notice shall send to the department 
within five days after the date of arrest and service of the notice the per-
son's license along with a copy of the citation issued regarding the offense, 
and a sworn report indicating the chemical test results, if any, and any 
other basis for the officer's determination that the person has violated 
section 41-6-44, and the officer's belief regarding the person's violation of 
section 41-6-44. Each such report shall be on a form approved by the de-
partment and shall be endorsed by the police chief or his equivalent or by a 
person authorized by him, other than the officer serving the notice. 
(5) Upon written request of a person who has been issued a 30-day li-
cense, the department shall grant to the person an opportunity to be heard 
within 30 days after the date of arrest and issuance of the 30-day license, 
but the request must be made within 10 days of the date of the arrest and 
issuance of the 30-day license A hearing, if held, shall be before the depart-
ment in the county in which the arrest occurred, unless the department and 
the person agree that the hearing may be held in some other county The 
hearing shall be documented and its scope shall cover the issues of whether 
a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been 
operating a motor vehicle in violation of section 41-6-44, whether the per-
son refused to submit to the test, and the test results, if any In connection 
with a heanng the department or its duly authorized agent may administer 
oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the 
production of relevant books and papers One or more members of the 
department ma\ conduct the hearing, and any decision made after a hear-
ing before any number of the members of the department shall be as valid 
as if made after a hearing before the full membership of the department 
After the heanng, the department shall order, either that the person's 
license or privilege to drive be suspended or that it not be suspended A first 
suspension, whether ordered or not challenged under this subsection, shall 
be for a penod of 90 days, beginning on the 31st day after the date of the 
arrest A second or subsequent suspension under this subsection shall be 
for a period of 120 days, beginning on the 31st day after the date of arrest 
The department shall assess against a person, in addition to any fee im-
posed under subsection 41-2-8(7), a fee of $25, which must be paid before 
the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative costs, 
and which fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealled de-
partment-hearing or court decision that the suspension was not proper A 
person whose license has been suspended by the department under this 
subsection may file a petition within 30 days after the suspension for a 
hearing in the matter which, if held, shall be governed by the provisions of 
section 41-2-20. 
BOUNTIFUL, A Munic ipal Corporat ion OCT OG 19BI 
ORDINANCE NO. 8 3 - 1 3 OFFICE OF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
AN ORDINANCE AMENDING TITLE VIII, CHAPTER 4, 
PART 5, SECTIONS 501-504 INCLUSIVE, BY MAKING 
IT UNLAWFUL: TO DRIVE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
ALCOHOL OR DRUGS OR A COMBINATION THEREOF; TO 
DRINK ANY ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE IN A MOTOR VEHICLE 
AND TO HAVE AN OPEN CONTAINER IN A VEHICLE, AND 
PROVIDING FOR PENALTIES IN VIOLATION THEREOF 
AND REPEALING ALL ORDINANCES, AND PARTS OF 
ORDINANCES IN CONFLICT THEREWITH. 
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF BOUNITFUL, 
UTAH AS FOLLOWS: 
Section 1. Title VIII, Chapter 4, Part 5, Sections 501-504 
inclusive, of the Revised Ordinances of Bountiful, Utah, 1965, as 
amended, is hereby amended to read as follows: 
PART 5 
ALCOHOL AND DRUGS 
8-4-501 DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND DRUGS 
8-4-502 DRINKING IN VEHICLE 
8-4-503 OPEN CONTAINER IN VEHICLE 
8-4-501 DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND DRUGS 
(1) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this Section 
for any person with a blood alcohol content of .08 % 
or greater by weight, or who is under the influence of 
alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of alcohol 
and any drug, to a degree which renders the person 
incapable of safely driving a vehicle, to drive or be 
in actual physical control of a vehicle within this City. 
The fact that a person charged with violating this Section 
is, or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a 
drug, does not constitute a defense against any charge 
of violating this Section. 
(2) Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood shall be based 
upon grams of alcohol per one hundred centimeters of 
blood. 
Every person who is convicted the first time of a 
violation of Sub-section (1) of this Section shall be 
punished by imprisonment for not less than 60 days nor 
more than 6 months, or by a fine of two hundred and 
ninety nine dollars ($299.00) or by both such fine and 
imprisonment. 
In addition to the penalties provided for in Sub-section 
(3)# the Court shall, upon a first conviction, impose 
a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive 
hours nor more than 10 days with emphasis on serving in 
the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to 
work in a community-service work program for not less than 
2 nor more than 10 days and, in addition to the jail 
sentence or the work in the community-service work program, 
order the person to participate in an assessment and 
educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation 
facility. 
Upon a second conviction within five years after a first 
conviction under this Section, the Court shall, in addition 
to the penalties provided for in Sub-section (3), impose 
a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive 
hours nor more than 10 days with emphasis on serving in 
the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to work 
in a community-service work program for not less than 10 
nor more than 30 days and, in addition to the jail sentence 
or the work in the community-service work program, order 
the person to participate in an assessment and educational 
series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility and 
the Court may, in its discretion, order the person to 
obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
Upon a subsequent conviction within 5 years after a 
second conviction under this Section the Court shall, 
in addition to the penalties provided for in Sub-section 
(3), impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 
30 nor more than 90 days with emphasis on serving in 
the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to 
work in a community-service work project for not less 
than 30 nor more than 90 days and, in addition to the 
jail sentence or work in the community-service work 
program, order the person to obtain treatment at an 
alcohol rehabilitation facility. No portion of any 
sentence imposed under Sub-section (3) shall be sus-
pended and the convicted person shall not be eligible 
for parole or probation until such time as any sentence 
imposed under this Section has been served. Probation 
or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation of 
this Section shall not be terminated. 
(6) The provisions of Sub-sections (4) and (5) that require 
a sentencing Court to order a convicted person to 
participate in an assessment and educational series at 
a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility, obtain, in 
the discretion of the court, treatment at an alcohol 
rehabilitation facility, or obtain, mandatorily, treatment 
at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, or do any combina-
tion of those things, apply to a conviction for a violation 
of Section 8-4-919, of the Revised Ordinances of Bountiful, 
Utah, 1965, as amended, that qualifies as a prior offense 
under Sub-section (7), so as to require the Court to render 
the same order regarding education or treatment at an 
alcohol rehabilitation facility, or both, in connection 
with a first, second, or subsequent conviction under 
Section 8-4-919 of the Revised Ordinances of Bountiful, 
Utah, 1965, as amended, that qualifies as a prior offense 
under Sub-section (7), as he would render in connection 
with applying respectively, the first, second, or sub-
sequent conviction requirements of Sub-sections (4) and 
(5) of this Section. For purposes of determining whether 
a conviction under Section 8-4-919, of the Revised 
Ordinances of Bountiful, Utah, 1965, as amended, which 
qualified as a prior conviction under Sub-section (7), 
is a first, second, or subsequent conviction under this 
Section, a previous conviction under this Section or 
Section 8-4-919 of the Revised Ordinances of Bountiful, 
Utah, 1965, as amended, is deemed as a prior conviction. 
Any alcohol rehabilitation program and any community-
based or other education program provided for in this 
Section must be provided by the Department of Social 
Services. 
(7) (a) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of 
guilty or no contest to a charge of a violation of 
Section 8-4-919 of the Revised Ordinances of Bountiful, 
Utah, 1965, as amended, in satisfaction of, or as a 
substitute for, an original charge of a violation of 
this Section, the prosecution shall state for the 
record a factual basis for the plea, including 
whether or not there had been consumption of alcohol 
or drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant 
in connection with the offense. The statement shall 
be an offer of proof of the facts which show whether 
or not there was consumption of alcohol or drugs, 
or a combination of both, by the defendant, in 
connection with the offense. 
(b) The Court shall advise the defendant 
before accepting the plea offered under this Sub-
section of the consequences of a violation of 
Section 4-8-919 of the Revised Ordinances of Bountiful, 
Utah, 1965, as amended, as follows: If the Court 
accepts the defendant's plea of guilty or no contest 
to a charge of violating Section 8-4-919, and the 
prosecutor states for the record that there was 
consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination 
of both, by the defendant in connection with the 
offense, the resulting conviction shall be a prior 
offense for the purposes of Sub-section (5) of this 
Section. 
(c) The Court shall notify the Department of 
Kotor Vehicles of each conviction of Section 8-4-919 
of the Revised Ordinances of Bountiful, Utah, 1965, 
as amended, which shall be a prior offense for the 
purposes of Sub-section (5) of this Section. 
(8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person 
for a violation of this Section when the violation is 
coupled with an accident or collision in which the person 
is involved and when the violation has, in fact, been 
committed, although not in his presence, if the officer 
has reasonable cause to believe that the violation was 
committed by the person. 
8-4-502 DRINKING IN VEHICLE 
It is unlawful for any person to drink any alcoholic beverage 
while in a motor vehicle upon a public roadway. 
8-4-50 3 OPEN CONTAINER IN VEHICLE 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to have any alcoholic 
beverage in an open container in the passenger compartment 
of a vehicle being operated upon a public roadway. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person to drive a vehicle upon a 
public roadway where there is any alcoholic beverage in 
an open container in the passenger compartment of the 
vehicle. 
Section 2. Conflict, All ordinances, resolutions and order 
or parts thereof in conflict with the provisions of this 
Ordinance aref to the extent of such conflict hereby repealed, 
provided however that this repeal should not affect any act 
done or right accrued, any penalty incurred, any suit, 
prosecution or proceeding pending, nor shall the repeal hereby 
have the affect of revising any ordinance theretofore repealed 
or superceded. 
Section 3. Effective date. This Ordinance shall go into effect 
12:01 a.m., August 1, 1983. 
Passed by the City Council of Bountiful, Utah this 20th day 
of July, 1983. 
MAYOR 
